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FREE SPEECH HAS GOTTEN VERY 
EXPENSIVE: RETHINKING POLITICAL 
SPEECH REGULATION IN A  
POST-TRUTH WORLD 
JOHN A. BARRETT, JR.† 
INTRODUCTION 
Protecting free speech has been a foundational principle of 
American democracy since the nation’s founding.1  A core element 
of free speech has long been a prohibition on regulating political 
speech.2  The principle behind this protection holds that citizens 
are free to make whatever political pronouncements they wish and 
that their speech shall remain free from government suppression.  
Even within the limited exceptions to unfettered political speech, 
like defamation or libel, the speech is not banned but may merely 
result in liability.3  A premise underlying this view is that com-
peting viewpoints, by being made available to us all, will allow 
the best ideas to emerge and for truth to prevail over falsehood.4  
Even though such an approach may be imperfect at times, the 
historic view holds that the risks associated with regulating 
political speech are far worse: allowing the government and those 
in power to suppress dissenting voices and thereby consolidate 
power.5 
However, as the United States proceeds through the 2020 
election process, American democracy is under siege, and its 
historic viewpoint concerning the need for unfettered political 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.  
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
3 See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Does the First Amendment Protect Deliberate Lies?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/does-
the-first-amendment-protect-deliberate-lies/496004/ [https://perma.cc/EZN9-RFR6]. 
4 Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1519, 1523–27 (2019).  
5 Id. at 1525–26. 
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discourse is being challenged by the realities of a post-truth, 
globally interconnected era.  Ten years after Citizens United v. 
FEC,6 campaign spending continues to grow exponentially, and 
with it the corrupting influence of money in politics becomes ever 
more entrenched.7  Politicians lie about readily verifiable mat-
ters, often claiming they never said something when they have 
been videotaped saying what they now deny.8  Those acting on 
their behalf release false and misleading advertisements attack-
ing the candidate’s opponent, as well as doctored photographs 
and videos purporting to show compromising events that never 
occurred.9  Foreign state actors attack United States elections by 
sowing discord and spreading disinformation.10 
In addition to these threats and tied directly to how the 
United States regulates political speech, America finds itself 
deeply divided, with its citizens rejecting facts and information 
they disagree with as fake.11  People who should be able to vote 
are disenfranchised by mechanisms including unduly strict voter 
identification standards, inadequate access to polling stations, 
 
6 See generally 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
7 Thomas B. Edsall, After Citizens United, A Vicious Cycle of Corruption, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/opinion/citizens-united-
corruption-pacs.html [https://perma.cc/HLD7-NNMJ]. 
8 Sean Illing, “The Fish Rots from the Head”: A Historian on the Unique 
Corruption of Trump’s White House, VOX (Dec. 21, 2018, 9:06 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2017/11/16/16643614/trump-administration-corruption-russia-
investigation [https://perma.cc/4QS2-JB4K]; see also Oliver Hahl, Minjae Kim & 
Ezra W. Zuckerman Sivan, The Authentic Appeal of the Lying Demagogue: 
Proclaiming the Deeper Truth About Political Illegitimacy, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 5 
(2018); John Keane, Post-Truth Politics and Why the Antidote Isn’t Simply ‘Fact 
Checking’ and Truth, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 22, 2018, 10:47 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/post-truth-politics-and-why-the-antidote-isnt-simply-
fact-checking-and-truth-87364 [https://perma.cc/W7EW-8EUU]. 
9 Simon Parkin, The Rise of the Deepfake and the Threat to Democracy, 
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ng-
interactive/2019/jun/22/the-rise-of-the-deepfake-and-the-threat-to-democracy [https:// 
perma.cc/LR6L-DG3N]. 
10 See Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” 
and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1225 (2018); Brian 
Beyersdorf, Regulating the “Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in History”: 
Disclosure Requirements in Online Political Advertisements After the 2016 Election, 
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2019). 
11 Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 
74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 55 (2013); Amanda Taub, The Real Story About Fake News Is 
Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/ 
the-real-story-about-fake-news-is-partisanship.html [https://perma.cc/63VX-NX2K]. 
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and politically motivated purging of voter rolls.12  Overwhelming 
majorities vote for candidates of one party in a state, yet the 
other party controls the state legislature and wins a majority of 
that state’s seats in the federal House of Representatives due to 
gerrymandering.13  The Constitution’s system of checks and bal-
ances appears to be failing, as independent branches of govern-
ment and independent agencies appear to have become agents of 
an ever-growing executive branch.14 
At such a time, the United States must rethink how its 
democracy is structured.  The changes required will be broad and 
varied to combat these myriad challenges.  This Article focuses 
on the challenges presented by how the United States regulates 
political speech, particularly with the problems associated with 
the need for massive sums of money to run for office effectively, 
and the proliferation of disinformation being targeted at voters. 
The Article begins with an overview of why free speech is an 
essential component of democracy that must be protected.  It 
then turns to an analysis of the problems being created by the 
current legal framework governing political speech.  Next, the 
Article reviews the constitutional and regulatory parameters and 
the limits they place on regulating political speech, including 
some recent legislative proposals for change.  Finally, different 
possible solutions are evaluated.  After considering alternatives 
to address these concerns, the Article argues for two courses of 
action that should be taken to improve democracy by adjusting 
how America regulates political speech—one radical and long-
term, and one more modest and capable of immediate implemen-
tation.  In the long run, the Constitution should be amended to 
ban all television and digital political advertising.  More immedi-
ately, Congress should adopt a robust regime for rating political 
advertisements and news programming that evaluates truthful-
 
12 Danielle Root & Adam Barclay, Voter Suppression During the 2018 Midterm 
Elections, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:03 AM), https://www 
.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/11/20/461296/voter-suppression-
2018-midterm-elections/ [https://perma.cc/4NMK-89TA]; Ian Samuel, Rigging the 
Vote: How the American Right is on the Way to Permanent Minority Rule, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 4, 2018, 7:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/04/ 
america-minority-rule-voter-suppression-gerrymandering-supreme-court [https://perma 
.cc/X72Y-VTU7]. 
13 Samuel, supra note 12.  
14 Edward J. Larson, Checks and Balances . . . and Trump, BULWARK (Jan. 10, 
2020), https://thebulwark.com/checks-balances-and-trump/ [https://perma.cc/K8U7-
LMFX]. 
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ness, with such ratings being displayed as part of the content 
evaluated.  While these solutions will not fix all the problems 
challenging modern democracy in the United States, they would 
solve the challenges being caused by the way political speech is 
currently regulated. 
I.  FREE SPEECH AND THE ESSENTIAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR DEMOCRACY 
A healthy democracy requires a number of things, including 
free and fair elections, protection of basic human rights, adher-
ence to the rule of law,15 and free speech.  Free speech may well 
be the most important ingredient of all.16  Free speech is founda-
tional to how a democratic society is structured and led.  It helps 
create a marketplace of ideas for voters to choose among in 
structuring their societies, allowing the most popular ideas to 
become enacted as law and policy.17  Free speech, in the form of 
political advertising and debates, also allows voters to get to 
know candidates for office and their messages, so that people can 
make informed decisions when they vote as to who they want 
their leaders to be.18 
Just as free speech is foundational for a political market-
place in democracies, it is also essential for creating govern-
mental accountability.19  A democracy elects its leaders based on 
the preferences of the populace, and as such, the leaders must be 
accountable to the electorate.20  If the elected officials are not 
pursuing the goals and policies the voters want, the voters must 
be able to replace them.  As such, free speech in the short term 
allows voters to express their support for or opposition to the pro-
posals and decisions their leaders are making, thereby pressur-
ing leaders to adjust their stances to reflect the desires of their 
 
15 See AUSTL. CONSERVATION FOUND., BUILDING A HEALTHY DEMOCRACY 3 
(Sept. 2018) (discussing essential elements of a healthy democracy).  
16 Hasen, supra note 11, at 64; Peter Berkowitz, Defending Democratic Norms 
Requires Defending Free Speech, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Apr. 7, 2019), https:// 
www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/04/07/defending_democratic_norms_requires
_defending_free_speech_139981.html [https://perma.cc/P6P5-A82A]. 
17 Nunziato, supra note 4. 
18 Evan Richman, Note, Deception in Political Advertising: The Clash Between 
the First Amendment and Defamation Law, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 667 
(1998). 
19 Freedom of the Press, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/freedom-
press [https://perma.cc/F6HL-826L] (last visited May 18, 2021). 
20 Henry E. Dugan, Jr., Independent or Accountable, 48 MD. BAR J. 28, 30 (2015). 
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electorate.  Over a longer term, the ability to criticize the decisions 
of one’s leaders allows support to grow for electing new leaders 
and for modifying laws and regulations to meet a society’s 
changing needs.  Regardless of whether it is politicians responding 
to constituent pressure, electing new leaders, or approving new 
laws, free speech is a key component to creating accountability in 
a democracy. 
It is also generally accepted that it is best for a democracy to 
be designed in a manner that creates a meaningful and realistic 
chance for a broadly diverse cross-section of the population to be 
elected to office.21  If certain groups in the population can rarely, 
if ever, get elected to important positions, those groups are not 
really being represented, and thus their views and ideas are far 
less likely to be represented in the laws that get enacted.22  For 
example, a democracy is substantially weakened if one or more 
ethnicities or one gender is precluded from voting.  Similarly, a 
democracy where the rich and powerful are the only ones that 
can mount a successful political campaign essentially disenfran-
chises the poor and middle-class voters, whose views and prefer-
ences are far more likely to be pursued aggressively by someone 
from a similar background.  Furthermore, the long-term success 
of a democracy requires the people to believe that the govern-
ment they elect is legitimate, and when groups are excluded from 
voting or practically excluded from being elected, confidence in 
the legitimacy of the government is substantially eroded.23 
 
21 Heba El-Kholy, No Democracy Without Diversity, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PRO-
GRAMME (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourperspective/ 
ourperspectivearticles/2013/09/19/no-democracy-without-diversity-heba-el-kholy.html 
[https://perma.cc/FB3L-HEF2]; Bert Gambini, Democracy Depends upon Diversity, 
U. BUFF. NEWS CTR. (Aug. 28, 2018), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/releases/2018/ 
08/031.html [https://perma.cc/4JLA-GUHM]. 
22 Caterina Bulgarella, Why the Increased Diversity of the Next Congress is a 
Victory for Ethics, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2018, 8:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
caterinabulgarella/2018/11/19/why-the-increased-diversity-of-the-next-congress-is-a-
victory-for-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/SJ2L-3WPD]; Tyra A. Mariani, Why Meaningful 
Diversity in Government Matters, PAC. STANDARD (June 14, 2017), https:// 
psmag.com/news/why-meaningful-diversity-in-government-matters [https://perma.cc 
/3YVQ-VU7C]. 
23 See, e.g., Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legiti-
macy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 626 (2011). 
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II.  PROBLEMS IMPACTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
AFFECTED BY SPEECH DEREGULATION 
A. Economic Effects on Speech and Elections 
The candidate supported by the most money usually wins.24  
In recent years, the amount spent on political campaigns has 
catapulted to astronomic heights, with spending increasing by 
27% per year since 2012.25  Political advertisement spending is 
estimated to increase by another 57% from the 2018 election 
cycle to 2020, with 2.5 million more advertisements being run.26  
In 2008, candidates and outsiders spent over $5.3 billion running 
for office.27  By 2016, this amount had grown to $9.8 billion, 
which was surprisingly low, caused in part by the relatively low 
amount spent by the Trump campaign.28  Michael Bloomberg 
alone spent over $1 billion of his own money in his brief 
presidential run.29  Forecasts estimate as much as $15 billion will 
 
24 Karl Evers-Hillstrom, More Money, Less Transparency: A Decade Under 
Citizens United, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 14, 2020), https://dkftve4js3etk.cloudfront 
.net/news/reports/citizens-united/OpenSecrets-more-money-less%20transparency-a-
decade-under-citizens-united.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4L5-MHS9]. 
25 2020 Political Spending Projections, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/f/ 
?id=0000016b-b029-d027-a97f-f6a95aca0000 [https://perma.cc/6AAF-VLXC] (last vis-
ited May 20, 2021). It must be noted that engaging in an apples-to-apples 
comparison is tricky for political advertising spending, given that some data looks 
only at candidate spending and other data attempts to include outside spending on 
behalf of candidates. Further complicating matters, outside spending by certain 
groups does not have to be reported. 
26 Id. 
27 Jeanne Cummings, 2008 Campaign Costliest in U.S. History, POLITICO (Nov. 
5, 2008, 5:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2008/11/2008-campaign-costliest-
in-us-history-015283 [https://perma.cc/5L58-KJ3Z]. 
28 Kate Kaye, Data-Driven Targeting Creates Huge 2016 Political Ad Shift: 
Broadcast TV Down 20%, Cable and Digital Way Up, ADAGE (Jan. 3, 2017, 6:45 PM), 
https://adage.com/article/media/2016-political-broadcast-tv-spend-20-cable-52/307346 
[https://perma.cc/VTP8-P8B6]; see also Reid Wilson, Political Ad Spending Set to 
Explode in 2020, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews 
/campaign/473240-political-ad-spending-set-to-explode-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/G5KX-
4T97]. The Trump campaign spent $322 million on the election, which is $243 
million less than Clinton spent in 2016, $453 million less than Obama in 2012, and 
$138 million less than Mitt Romney in the same cycle. Jeremy W. Peters & Rachel 
Shorey, Trump Spent Far Less Than Clinton, but Paid His Companies Well, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/us/politics/campaign-
spending-donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/LVA7-FCQ2]. 
29 Benjamin Siegel & Soo Rin Kim, Mike Blomberg Spent More Than $1 Billion 
on Four-Month Presidential Campaign According to Filing (Apr. 20, 2020, 7:21 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/mike-bloomberg-spent-billion-month-presidential-
campaign-filing/story?id=70252435 [https://perma.cc/F5P7-TKBA]; see also Lisa Lerer, 
Michael Bloomberg Is Open to Spending $1 Billion To Defeat Trump, N.Y. TIMES 
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be spent on 2020 contests, which would be a new record.30  In 
comparison, the total spent on in the 2017 United Kingdom 
elections was about forty million pounds, a little over fifty million 
in United States dollars.31  Another way to look at how important 
money is in our electoral process, beyond the amount spent, is to 
consider why candidates drop out of a race.  Usually it is because 
they are not raising enough money to continue in a robust 
manner.32 
A major reason for these dramatic increases in spending is 
the development of super political action committees (“PACs”), 
independent advocacy committees that can accept unlimited 
contributions, which arose as a consequence of the 2010 decision 
in Citizens United v. FEC.33  Unlike other forms of donations to 
candidates and their campaigns, super PACs have no restrictions 
on the size of contributions people can make.34  Furthermore, 
both PACs and super PACs can spend unlimited amounts on 
behalf of a candidate.35  While PAC spending has remained rela-
tively constant, super PAC spending has skyrocketed.36  Frequen-
tly, the amount spent by super PACs on behalf of a candidate can 
 
(Jan. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/us/politics/michael-bloomberg-
spending.html [https://perma.cc/5VH5-T7G6]. 
30 Kristina Monllos, “Nothing Typical About This Year’s Political Ad Market”: As 
Crises Continue Forecasts Predict Higher Than Ever Political Ad Spending, DIGIDAY 
(June 17, 2020), https://digiday.com/marketing/nothing-typical-about-this-years-
political-ad-market-as-crises-continue-forecasts-predict-higher-than-ever-political-ad-
spending/ [https://perma.cc/6Y5V-FQ7G]. 
31 Jenny Anderson, The Three Things That Make British Elections so Different 
from American Ones, QUARTZ (Nov. 7, 2019), https://qz.com/1743234/the-three-main-
differences-between-us-and-uk-elections/ [https://perma.cc/ZC7Y-K7MU]. 
32 See, e.g., Elena Schneider, Cash Shortage Hits Dem Presidential Field, 
POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2019, 5:17 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/16/2020-
election-democrats-fundraising-spending-048210 [https://perma.cc/2JWG-S2A6]. 
33 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (2018); 
Contribution Limits, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-
and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits/ [https://perma.cc/5YNS-
YN6X] (last visited May 20, 2021); Andrew Prokop, The Citizens United Era of 
Money in Politics, Explained, VOX (July 15, 2015, 11:39 PM), https://www.vox.com 
/2015/2/9/18088962/super-pacs-and-dark-money [https://perma.cc/5GGW-2925]. 
34 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(4); Contribution Limits, supra note 33; Prokop, supra 
note 33. 
35 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8); Contribution Limits, supra note 33; Prokop, supra 
note 33. 
36 Karl Evers-Hillstrom et al., A Look at the Impact of Citizens United on Its 9th 
Anniversary, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 21, 2019, 12:06 PM), https://www.opensecrets 
.org/news/2019/01/citizens-united/ [https://perma.cc/2MB8-W2DS] (reporting $416 
million in PAC spending in 2008 and $497 million in spending in 2018). 
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equal or exceed the amount spent by the campaign itself.37  In the 
ten years of their existence, super PACs had spent approximately 
$3 billion before 2020 election spending began ramping up,38 with 
total outside spending topping $4.5 billion in the last decade.39  
Just under one-quarter of all advertising expenditures for house 
races in 2018 were by outside sources.40   
Why have political campaigns become so expensive?  The 
answer is simple: the cost of television advertising.  The lion’s 
share of the sums described above are being spent to bombard 
the airwaves.41  In the 2016 election cycle, broadcast television 
spending was 5.5 times greater than the next-highest medium, 
cable television.42  Combining these two television formats makes 
digital, radio, and newspaper spending comparatively minor.  
Getting one’s name and message out on TV is seen as an essen-
tial component to getting elected, and TV time is expensive.  Of 
the $9.8 billion spent in the 2016 election cycle, $4.4 billion was 
spent on television advertising.43  And these amounts are set to 
explode in the 2020 election.  Comparing the first ten months of 
2015 to a similar period in 2019, over twice as many political 
advertisements had been run on television—and that was before 
Michael Bloomberg entered the race.44  Although he did not enter 
the race until November 24, 2019,45 Bloomberg spent over $1 
 
37 Since Citizens United, outside parties have spent more than the candidate in 
126 races, whereas this had happened only 15 times in the 5 prior election cycles. 
Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 24. 
38  Ian Vandewalker, Since Citizens United, a Decade of Super PACs, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
opinion/citizens-united-decade-super-pacs [https://perma.cc/4AE7-4TTF]. 
39 Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 24. 
40 Erika Franklin Fowler et al., The Big Lessons of Political Advertising in 2018, 
THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 3, 2018, 6:34 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-big-
lessons-of-political-advertising-in-2018-107673 [https://perma.cc/G4JN-Z6BQ]. 
41 Jacob S. Hacker & Nathan Loewentheil, How Big Money Corrupts the Econo-
my, 27 DEMOCRACY 32, 37 (2013), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/27/how-
big-money-corrupts-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/9SZK-X8U9]. 
42 Statista Research Department, Political Advertising Spending in the United 
States in the 2016 Election Season, by Medium, STATISTA (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www 
.statista.com/statistics/470711/presidential-election-season-ad-spend/ [https://perma 
.cc/SW39-Q7CT]. 
43 Kaye, supra note 28. 
44 Nathaniel Rakich, We’ve Already Seen Twice as Many Presidential TV Ads 
Than at This Point in the 2016 Election, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 23, 2019, 10:08 
AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/weve-already-seen-twice-as-many-presidential-
tv-ads-as-at-this-point-in-the-2016-election/ [https://perma.cc/675D-MSGH]. 
45 Dan Merica, Christina Alesci & Jake Tapper, Michael Bloomberg is the Latest 
2020 Democratic Hopeful, CNN POL. (Nov. 24, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://www.cnn 
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billion on his brief presidential campaign, beating out second-
place spender Tom Steyer at just around $345 million.46  Donald 
Trump and Michael Bloomberg each spent over $10 million for 
about one minute of national advertising during the 2020 Super 
Bowl.47  While no other advertising time comes near that cost, 
broadcasting ads across the nation over multiple months of 
primaries and general elections adds up fast.   
What other costs does a campaign have?  One such cost is ad-
vertising via social media and the web.  While digital content—
excluding cable—is quickly growing in its relative importance in 
elections, its reach remains more limited than television.48  
Additionally, major network television—excluding news chan-
nels—consistently reaches a broad cross-section of the populace, 
whereas people are far more likely to self-select webpages or 
follow social media feeds on sites like Twitter that reinforce the 
views they already hold.49  As such, social media may be a great 
way to reinforce a message to your base via pages they are likely 
to visit, but it is less effective at reaching a broader audience of 
potential new supporters.50  Even more important, the relative 
cost of internet-based advertising is small compared to television 
advertising.51  With over $350 million spent on advertising 




46 Siegel & Kim, supra note 29; see also Shane Goldmacher, Michael Bloomberg 
Spent More than $900 Million on His Failed Presidential Run, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/politics/bloomberg-campaign-900-million 
.html [https://perma.cc/WM3Z-EKLY]; Expenditures Breakdown, Tom Steyer, 2020 Cy-
cle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/expenditures 
/tom-steyer?id=N00044966 [https://perma.cc/77VK-5QTR] (last visited May 20, 2021). 
47 Nick Corasaniti, Bloomberg and Trump Buy Super Bowl Ads at $10 Million 
Each, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/politics 
/bloomberg-trump-super-bowl-ad.html [https://perma.cc/7DLJ-NWYZ]. 
48 Shereta Williams, Why Political Advertisers Double Down on Local TV and 
What Brand Media Pros Can Learn from Them, MEDIAPOST (Jan. 8, 2020), https:// 
www.mediapost.com/publications/article/345329/why-political-advertisers-double-down-
on-local-tv.html [https://perma.cc/R65R-GEW9]. 
49 Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1270; see also Ari Lightman, On TV, Political 
Ads Are Regulated—but Online, Anything Goes, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 21, 2019, 
3:16 PM), http://theconversation.com/on-tv-political-ads-are-regulated-but-online-
anything-goes-126553 [https://perma.cc/5KQZ-J95U]. 
50 See Erika Franklin Fowler et al., Political Advertising Online and Offline, 114 
AM. POL. SCI. R. 1, 1–2 (2020). 
51 Id. at 2. 
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$31 million of that on Facebook advertising.52  However, digital’s 
share is growing, with 2020 expected to reach 20% of total 
spending, compared with almost 75% for television.53  Digital 
advertising spending grew 789% from 2012 to 2016, where it 
reached $1.4 billion.54  Digital spending topped  $2.1 billion in the 
2020 elections.55  Social media pages created by a candidate or by 
supporters cost little for global reach.56  Similarly, social media 
posts can be handled by a few volunteers, but even if a few people 
are paid to perform such tasks, such expenses are trivial 
compared to television advertising costs.  Even buying ads online 
is much cheaper than buying ads on television.57  One thirty-
second ad during the show This Is Us cost about $434,000 in 
2018, whereas a Facebook ad running for months could cost a 
fraction of that.58   
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last-two-weeks [https://perma.cc/E7LQ-973Z]. Facebook and Google are the two most 
popular digital advertising platforms in the United States, with Facebook receiving 
about twice the level of political spending as Google gets. Anna Massoglia & Karl 
Evers-Hillstrom, 2020 Presidential Candidates Top $100M in Digital Ad Spending 
as Twitter Goes Dark, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov. 14, 2019, 2:08 PM), https://www 
.opensecrets.org/news/2019/11/digital-ad-spending-2020-presidential-candidates-top-
100m/ [https://perma.cc/PPW9-MMBD]. 
53 Nicole Perrin, Political Ad Spending to Reach $6 Billion for 2020 Election, 
EMARKETER (July 19, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/political-ad-spend-
to-reach-6-billion-for-2020-election [https://perma.cc/2LF9-RFHJ]; Joe Mandese, 2020 
Political Spending to Hit $6 Billion, Digital Will Be Biggest Gainer, MEDIAPOST: 
MEDIADAILYNEWS (June 27, 2019), https://www.mediapost.com/publications 
/article/337563/2020-political-spending-to-hit-6-billion-digital.html [https://perma.cc 
/KB98-VTFB]. 
54 Kaye, supra note 28. In the 2012 election cycle, digital spending accounted for 
just $159 million. Id.  
55 Online Political Ad Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 11, 2021), https://www 
.opensecrets.org/online-ads [https://perma.cc/27CU-5ZDA]; see also 2020 Political 
Spending Projections, supra note 25. 
56 See Fowler et al., supra note 50, at 1, 4, 6; Tarleton Gillespie, We Need to Fix 
Online Advertising. All of It, SLATE (Nov. 15, 2019, 7:11 PM), https://slate 
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Radio spending is comparatively minor, with total expendi-
tures for the 2016 election cycle totaling $621 million.59  Like-
wise, direct mail is comparatively insignificant, totaling just $301 
million in 2016.60  Yard signs have an even more limited reach 
and also add little to overall campaign costs.61   
When one considers super PAC expenditures, the cost break-
downs become even more lopsided.  Without the need for on-
ground staff that a campaign requires, super PACs expend 
essentially all their funds on advertising, with the majority of 
that being spent on television.62   
Due to the need to spend monumental amounts on television 
and digital advertising, candidates have only two options: be rich 
or spend a significant amount of time raising money for the next 
campaign.63  For many, there is obviously no choice: the only 
option is to raise lots of cash.  Even for the rich, a major senatorial 
or presidential run will cost far more than most candidates are 
willing to part with from their own funds.64  With that being said, 
the effects of each of these options can be readily observed. 
The first effect of the need for massive funds is how it 
impacts the ability of people who are not rich to run for major 
office.  In the early stages of the 2020 presidential race, three 
candidates were billionaires, and as many as another twenty-two 
were millionaires.65  It is likely that only one of the major 
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useless [https://perma.cc/KC5U-M7DQ]. 
62 Prokop, supra note 33. 
63 Daniel P. Valentine, Comment, November Madness: A Proposal for Represen-
tative Democracy Brackets to Eliminate the Undue Influence of Money on Elections, 4 
TEX. A&M L. REV. 137, 141–42 (2016). 
64 See How Much Does It Cost To Become President?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 31, 
2020), https://www.investopedia.com/insights/cost-of-becoming-president [https://perma 
.cc/46PH-5ZT4]; Julia Glum, All the Senators Running for Re-Election in the 2018 
Midterms, Ranked by How Much They’re Spending to Keep Their Jobs, MONEY (Nov. 
2, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://money.com/all-the-senators-running-for-reelection-in-the-
2018-midterms-ranked-by-how-much-theyre-spending-to-keep-their-jobs [https://perma 
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65 Net Worth of 2020 Presidential Candidates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www 
.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/financial-disclosures-and-net-worth [https:// 
perma.cc/2MUW-8MDU] (last visited May 20, 2021); Dan Alexander et al., The Net 
Worth of Every 2020 Presidential Candidate, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
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competitive contenders was not at least a millionaire, and of the 
last eleven Democratic candidates in the race, it is likely only two 
of them were not millionaires while they were running.66  Even at 
the congressional level, 40% of elected officials are millionaires.67  
By comparison, in 2018 only 6.21% of American households had a 
net worth over a million dollars,68 although this number has 
grown significantly in recent years given the steady growth in 
the stock market since 2009.69  As was previously discussed, if 
only the rich can successfully run for office, democracy is eroded 
by disenfranchising the voice of the middle and lower classes.70 
More directly and importantly, all but the very richest must 
raise massive amounts of money to run for office.  Raising money 
consumes a significant amount of a politician’s time.71  In practice, 
politicians raise a significant percentage of their campaign funds 
from major donors, given their access to large sums of money: in 
the 2018 midterms, only 0.47% of the population gave $200 or 
more to political campaigns, yet such contributions accounted for 
71% of the money contributed toward the election.72  Given the 
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66 Of former Vice President Joe Biden, Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth War-
ren, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar, and 
South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg, only Buttigieg was known not to be a millionaire. 
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limits on individual contributions that can be made directly to 
candidates, such fundraising often takes the form of 
contributions to super PACs formed to act on behalf of a specific 
candidate.73  Two-thirds of donations to super PACs were over $1 
million.74  Regardless of whether a contribution goes directly to a 
candidate’s campaign or a super PAC, its corrosive effect on 
democracy is the same. 
The practical effect of having to raise significant funds from 
mega-donors is that once a politician is elected, she feels behold-
en to her major donors, and therefore feels pressure to promote 
laws and policies favored by them.75  If this pressure were not 
effective in influencing which policies a politician promotes, 
mega-donors would not keep giving—they demand a return on 
their investment.  There is a clear and demonstrable correlation 
between a politician’s positions to those of her major donors.76  
Additionally, the prospect of a major donation provides access to 
the politician, allowing a mega-donor to pitch her agenda directly 
to the candidate.77  The combined effects of needing money from 
mega-donors—knowing what these donors desire and knowing 
they will give only if a politician pursues their goals—corrupts 
democracy by diluting the influence of the overwhelming 
majority of voters.78 
B. Misinformation’s Effects on Elections 
In the not too distant past, most Americans agreed on what 
was going on in the world—on the “facts.”79  But the world has 
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changed,80 and as a society we are no longer able to agree on 
what the facts are.81  We live in an era where there are conserva-
tive and liberal news stations and a virtually uncountable number 
of partisan news sources online.82  As such, most people now self-
select into news sources that reflect their political predisposi-
tions.83  Additionally, with the advent of twenty-four hour news 
networks, these networks need to fill the broadcasting day, and 
people just are not going to watch the same stories repeatedly for 
extended periods.  As such, much of the programming has evolved 
into commentary or opinion-based shows that reflect the political 
orientation of the network and its viewers.84  Some of these 
programs significantly distort the truth, and even misrepresent it 
on a recurring basis.85  While there is nothing wrong per se with 
political commentary shows or websites, they run a substantial 
risk of confusing their viewers as to what is fact and what is 
opinion,86 especially when airing on a news network or when a 
news ticker tape is scrolling across the screen.  Not surprisingly, 
everyone has noticed that the “news” being reported is not the 
same on the various networks, which has led an increasing num-
ber of people to believe that they just cannot trust the news or 
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that the news others listen to is “fake news.”87  This feedback loop 
further erodes any sense that there is any truth beyond one’s 
preexisting biases and creates a major barrier to informing the 
electorate adequately. 
There is an old joke that asks: “How do you know when a 
politician is lying?”  The answer being: “His lips are moving.”  
This adage reflects the view that politicians lie regularly, both 
currently and historically.  However, things seem to have gotten 
worse.  Previously, there appeared to be some minimal level of 
shame that even politicians possessed that constrained just how 
far they would go in bending the truth.  America now lives in a 
post-shame era88 with “alternative facts,” where politicians will 
blatantly lie about observable or verifiable truths—misrepre-
senting their positions and those of their opponents.89  They will 
say they have never said something even though there is video-
tape of them saying it,90 and increasingly, they will post doctored 
photographs and videos.91  These lies may come in the form of 
reported statements or political advertising.   
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What kind of accountability is there for this lying?  The sad 
answer is, almost none.  Political speech is the most important of 
all of the types of free speech our Constitution protects.92  The 
stakes involved here are so high that the courts are reluctant to 
even consider holding politicians accountable for their lies, out of 
fear that any limitations in this area could easily be perverted 
into state suppression of dissent.93  While this is a real and 
critical concern, the practical effect is that for a politician with no 
shame, there is virtually no pressure to tell the truth.94  And 
there is no legal accountability for false or misleading state-
ments.95  Thus, any lie told in a political advertisement is unlike-
ly to have any negative legal consequences for the speaker.  Not 
only is the person running the commercial unlikely to face any 
personal consequences, the advertisement—and the lies within 
it—can continue to run and spread disinformation.  Furthermore, 
when the news networks report on what a politician has said, the 
report is filtered through the bias of the network or host.  The 
networks aligned with the general political orientation of the 
speaker will typically ignore or downplay any lies, and those with 
a different orientation will point out untruths.96   
While this facially creates the opportunity for accountability 
and repercussions when a politician lies, these hopes fail in the 
face of the realities of our current political and information 
ecosystem.  With a two-party system close to being evenly split in 
electoral support,97 pressure on a politician to change her be-
havior must come not only from the opposition but also from her 
own supporters.  While one would expect a certain amount of 
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deference or forgiveness from one’s supporters, this is generally 
not unlimited.  For some, certain types of behavior—if known—
will be unacceptable and will cause a supporter to cease her 
support.  And for almost everyone, support will be withdrawn if a 
politician actively pursues laws and policies contrary to one’s 
important preferences.  However, most Americans receive their 
information from news sources that reflect their own biases, and 
those sources increasingly tend to minimize misbehavior by 
politicians they align with.98  Politicians are increasingly unlikely 
to get pushback from their supporters, which is essential for 
accountability.   
When one considers super PACs, and the enormous amounts 
they spend on political advertising, the situation is even worse.  
Like politicians themselves,99 there is virtually no accountability 
for inaccuracies in their advertisements, since we place such a 
high value on allowing unfettered and unaccountable political 
speech.100  Compounding the problem is the manner in which we 
regulate super PACs.  One of the reasons super PACs are allowed 
to spend unlimited amounts on a candidate’s behalf is that they 
are prohibited from coordinating with the candidate.101  While at 
first glance this may seem like a good way to keep politicians 
from being “bought” by big-money interest groups, it fails to keep 
money from corrupting the process102 and creates less account-
ability for the spread of disinformation.  As has been well docu-
mented, politicians provide access to lobbyists and mega-donors, 
and can still be beholden when mega-donors contribute to super 
PACs.103  Both by meeting with these people to hear their agendas 
and through passive communication from a candidate about her 
general campaigning preferences, the lobbyist is able to make her 
positions known to the politician, and the politician is able to 
have a high degree of confidence that the super PACs supporting 
her will generally act in a manner the candidate supports.104  
However, since the politician and the super PAC are officially 
precluded from coordinating, the advertisements run by the 
super PAC can be even less truthful and more misleading than 
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those run by the politician herself.  The lack of coordination 
essentially provides a shield against the politician being blamed 
for the content of super PAC advertisements, no matter how 
egregious.105  Not surprisingly, the sleaziest political ads are 
almost always from super PACs; these ads further spread 
misinformation to the detriment of a healthy democracy.106 
Of course, there are other actors out there creating and 
spreading disinformation.  With the relatively low cost of creating 
websites and of disseminating information through social media 
platforms,107 it should come as no surprise that there is a signifi-
cant number of independent actors with strongly held political 
views that create and post false or misleading information.108  
This misinformation is then shared by misled consumers.109  In 
the worst cases, these fabrications are picked up by news out-
lets110 or the politicians themselves,111 thereby amplifying their 
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“Disinformation” on Ukraine, WEEK (Feb. 7, 2020), https://theweek.com/speedreads 
/894352/fox-news-warns-fox-news-about-spreading-protrump-disinformation-ukraine 
[https://perma.cc/GR9S-V52L] (highlighting that Fox News guests have spread 
“disinformation” about the Trump-Ukraine scandal). 
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President, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2020, 2:30 PM), https://www.theatlantic 
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spread.  Even when this does not occur, it is easy for people to be 
misled since voters often look for online information to validate 
their pre-existing biases.112  The First Amendment’s protection of 
political speech assumes that deceptions will be exposed in the 
marketplace of ideas, but social media and the internet es-
sentially bypass the marketplace by directly targeting those that 
are receptive to their message.113  Further compounding this 
problem are hostile foreign state actors.  There is significant 
evidence to support the conclusion that multiple foreign govern-
ments now create misinformation and disseminate it on a 
widespread basis.114  With the resources and technology available 
to them, these governments can have a significantly larger im-
pact on the number of people misled by these campaigns than 
individual rogue actors.115 
 
social media for their own purposes—jamming the signals, sowing confusion.”); 
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WASH. POST (July 30, 2020, 11:47 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
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facebook-wont-it-must-at-least-moderate-them/2019/11/01/9d3457c0-fc01-11e9-ac8c-
8eced29ca6ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/7VKH-PW9V]; see generally Wood & Ravel, 
supra note 10. 
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BROOKINGS (July 31, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/07/31 
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www.axios.com/misinformation-disinformation-human-actors-e490d5ee-4480-44a8-
8922-e724cd852acb.html [https://perma.cc/K9GQ-PZQQ]; see generally Beyersdorf, 
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Taken together, the compounded lies and misinformation 
spread through these methods severely impact how well informed 
voters are, and democracy cannot function properly with an 
ignorant electorate.116  An increasing number of people just believe 
what they choose to believe and disregard any information, no 
matter how credible, that contradicts their position.117  In such an 
echo chamber, properly informing voters becomes almost impos-
sible.  Good decisions on how to vote come from having quality 
information about the candidates and their positions.118  The 
current climate makes it hard for a candidate to clearly get her 
message out and makes it likely that many voters will be 
misled.119  In such a situation, it is hard for voters to know 
enough to vote intelligently, and equally hard for them to hold 
their leaders accountable.   
C. Technology’s Effects on Elections 
Some of the disinformation problems described above are 
directly attributable to the internet and social media, which 
allow virtually anyone to have a worldwide platform easily and 
at little cost.  These problems are unlikely to be resolved in the 
future, given current technology.  Until quite recently,120 social 
media platforms had done little to police the accuracy of the 
content their users post, and have often aggressively resisted 
efforts to make them do more.121  In some ways, this makes 
sense—when billions of people can all write their own posts, 
overseeing such a colossal amount of data is a herculean task, 
without even considering the potentially chilling effects on free 
speech.  But even if the will were present in these companies to 
 
Facebook and Instagram posts, while uploading more than 1,000 YouTube videos. 
The tweets garnered 288 million views and the Facebook posts reached 126 million 
US accounts.”). 
116 Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1234–37. 
117 See generally Napoli, supra note 83. 
118 Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1234–37; Hasen, supra note 11, at 55–56. 
119 See Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1234–37. 
120 As the 2020 election approaches, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have 
begun labelling some misleading posts and removing others that violate their 
policies on manipulated media. See Rachel Lerman et al., Twitter Penalizes Donald 
Trump Jr. for Posting Hydroxychloroquine Misinformation Amid Coronavirus 
Pandemic, WASH. POST (July 28, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/nation/2020/07/28/trump-coronavirus-misinformation-twitter/ [https://perma.cc 
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121 Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1244–46; see also Beyersdorf, supra note 10, 
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combat political disinformation, it would quickly devolve into the 
world’s largest game of whack-a-mole.122  Given the ease of 
creating and disseminating bogus digital content, foreign states 
and rogue actors can quickly create new sources of disinforma-
tion any time a source is shut down or removed.123  Furthermore, 
there are multiple platforms available, and many reside outside 
of the United States’ jurisdiction—even though they are readily 
accessible from American devices.  Thus, foreign states and rogue 
actors can easily create and disseminate bogus content outside 
the reach of the American government’s power to regulate them 
effectively. 
To make matters worse, the ability to create fake content is 
only growing.  From the perspective of trying to have an informed 
electorate, few things are scarier than the ever-increasing ability 
to create “deep-fakes”—realistic photos and videos of people doing 
or saying things that they never did or said.124  They say a picture 
is worth a thousand words, and with good reason.  Few things 
are more powerfully persuasive in affecting one’s opinion than 
seeing someone say or do something.125  The ability to create 
these realistic fabrications will have devastating effects on how 
misinformed voters will become in the future, and will only 
exacerbate the mistrust of information that does not comport 
with one’s biases.126  This impact is certain to be further ampli-
fied as politicians and news outlets re-transmit such content, 
thereby giving it increased credibility to the viewer.  In the last 
year, we have seen several examples of high-level politicians and 
their allies promoting a blatantly false message using this 
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technology.127  While the quality of most of these materials, 
particularly videos, makes it relatively easy to spot fabrications, 
it will not be long before they become virtually indistinguishable 
from real content.  How is democracy to survive in an era where 
it is so easy to completely deceive voters, especially when this 
new wrinkle is stacked on top of all the other information 
problems that democracy faces? 
III.  REGULATION OF POLITICAL SPEECH 
Political speech has long been recognized as the most 
important type of free speech there is.128  America is so concerned 
about the risk of chilling or suppressing it that it essentially 
chooses to err on the side of letting almost anything be said—
without accountability for its accuracy.   
A. First Amendment Limitations 
Protection for free speech is enshrined in the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, which has been found to 
protect the inviolability of the marketplace of ideas.129   
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content . . . .  To permit the 
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure 
self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed 
the right to express any thought, free from government 
censorship.  The essence of this forbidden censorship is content 
control.  Any restriction on expressive activity because of its 
content would completely undercut the “profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wi[d]e-open.”130   
Based on well-developed jurisprudence, one’s freedom of 
speech is generally presumed to be protected unless it falls 
within the scope of one of the narrow exceptions that have been 
recognized.131  Even then, our system strongly prefers to create 
 
127 Cowan et al., supra note 91; Ghaffary, supra note 91; Ross, supra note 91; 
Frum, supra note 91; see also Halpern, supra note 113. 
128 Killion, supra note 92. 
129 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010). 
130 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (quoting N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).  
131 Exceptions include, among other things, fighting words, inciting violence or 
other imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, and breaches of national 
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liability for unprotected speech rather than prohibiting it in the 
first place.132  While defamation, or lying about someone else, is 
generally an exception, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell133 reaffirmed 
an actual malice standard for liability to public figures.134  Actual 
malice is a high defamation bar for public figures; it makes their 
likelihood of recovering remote.135  This standard creates a cause 
of action for lies about fact, but statements of opinion are not 
actionable regardless of how irrational a speaker’s opinion is.136  
Thus, by merely couching a fabrication in the language of an 
opinion, any potential liability is essentially removed due to the 
difficulty of proving intent.  Even though there is a clear differ-
ence between saying “Bob molests children” and “I believe Bob 
molests children,” how likely is a voter to truly internalize that 
difference while watching an advertisement?  Further complicat-
ing matters, the time it takes to complete a lawsuit is almost 
always longer than the length of a campaign.  As such, an 
opponent’s lies will be able to do their damage, and voters will 
have voted with this misinformation circulating.137  When these 
limitations are added to the risk of politicians harming their own 
image by suing, and the fact that the only compensation is 
monetary, it is not surprising that defamation suits by politicians 
are rare.138 
While the details are beyond the scope of this Article, it must 
be noted that the standard of review for regulations on speech 
varies depending on the type of speech involved.  For example, 
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138 See Weller, supra note 137 (explaining that if politicians sue, then discovery 
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638 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:615   
the standards for regulating commercial speech are lower than 
those for political speech.139  Government regulations on political 
speech must meet a strict scrutiny standard of review by showing 
(1) a compelling state interest for such regulation, (2) that the 
regulation is narrowly tailored to meet such purpose, and (3) that 
the method chosen to achieve such purpose is the least restrictive 
means available.140  This high standard has routinely led to the 
invalidation of statutory attempts to place restrictions on po-
litical advertisements. 
In Citizens United v. FEC, one of the most important recent 
cases on regulating political speech, the Supreme Court of the 
United States applied strict scrutiny to rules promulgated by the 
Federal Elections Commission (“FEC”) that limited the ability of 
corporations and unions to spend money in support of candi-
dates.141  FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.142 had previously 
made clear that the FEC cannot prohibit third parties from 
political advertising, provided the advertising does not advocate 
directly for or against a candidate, which set the stage for dark 
money contributions through 501(c)(4) entities.143  The Court 
went further in Citizens United; the rules at issue there failed 
the strict scrutiny test because the Court found no compelling 
governmental interest in limiting political speech by corporations 
in preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”144   
The Court also effectively held that money was the equiv-
alent of speech, stating “[a]ll speakers, including individuals and 
the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to 
fund their speech.  The First Amendment protects the resulting 
 
139 See Killion, supra note 92; see also R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern 
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speech . . . .”145  One of the arguments put forth in support of the 
campaign-spending limitation was to limit the corrupting influ-
ence of money on politics, out of a concern that the need for 
campaign funding could lead politicians to engage in a quid pro 
quo with a big-money donor.146  While the Court previously 
deemed the anti-corruption interest sufficiently important to 
allow contribution limits,147 the Court was unwilling to extend 
this reasoning to direct expenditures made by persons, including 
corporations, in support of or in opposition to a candidate.148  
Justice Kennedy indicated that acceptable limitations on cam-
paign spending are “limited to [those targeting] quid pro quo 
corruption,” which the majority defined as “dollars for political 
favors,” not mere favoritism or access.149  This was subsequently 
clarified as “captur[ing] the notion of a direct exchange of an 
official act for money.”150  In essence, to limit such expenditures 
of money is to muzzle speech, and concerns about corruption 
could be met through more narrowly tailored policies like dis-
closure requirements.   
Based on this holding, the super PAC was born, allowing 
unlimited contributions and expenditures during election cycles, 
provided that the super PAC does not coordinate with the 
candidate that it advocates for.151  Another argument rejected by 
the Court was that corporations are spending money that ulti-
mately belongs to its owners—the shareholders—and that the 
government should be able to regulate corporate expenditures to 
protect dissenting shareholders from being forced to fund 
political speech they may disagree with.152 
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146 Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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B. Federal Trade Commission Limits on Advertising 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulates adver-
tising and generally requires advertisements to be accurate and 
truthful.153  However, there is a major exception for political 
advertisements.  Under Section 315 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934, broadcast television networks are prohibited 
from blocking political advertisements from a candidate based on 
their content.154  By its terms, this limitation applies only to 
broadcast networks, but cable television companies largely 
adhere to it as well.155  And although, based on the wording of the 
statute, it does not apply to advertising by outside groups such as 
PACs and super PACs, networks remain hesitant to block such 
content in all but the most extreme cases.156  Thus, surprisingly, 
the law requires more truth in advertising for a hamburger than 
in critically important political advertising.157   
C. Federal Election Law Limitations 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 limits the 
amount that donors can give to political campaigns.158  However, 
the government may not cap the total amount a campaign may 
spend on an election.159  The individual donation limits are based 
both on who is making the donation and who will receive the 
donation.160  For example, in 2020, an individual can give up to 
$2,800 to a candidate, $5,000 to a PAC, $10,000 to a non-national 
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party committee, and $35,500 to a national party committee per 
election.161  On the other hand, a national party committee can 
give $5,000 to a candidate and $5,000 to a PAC, but has no limits 
on transfers to party committees.162  After McCutcheon v. FEC, 
caps on total combined contributions to all candidates a person 
wishes to support are prohibited.163 
More importantly, given Citizens United, there are no limits 
on contributions to super PACs.164  Thus, the limitations are es-
sentially meaningless, since anyone can give as much as they 
want over the stated limits to a super PAC formed to support a 
particular candidate.165  Over two-thirds of super PAC contri-
butions are more than one million dollars,166 making a mockery of 
the FEC limits on contributions to candidates.  While candidates 
and super PACs are technically barred from coordinating, it is 
well understood that super PACs frequently choreograph their 
activities with the campaigns they support, and many super 
PACs are actually run by party leaders who carefully align their 
spending with that of the party.167  Despite numerous potential 
violations of this prohibition on coordination, the FEC has not 
imposed a single penalty for such actions since Citizens United.168 
While super PACs contain no limits on the amounts they can 
spend on a candidate’s behalf, they must disclose who their 
donors are.169  However, large-money donors often do not want 
their identities revealed—especially if they are helping create 
misleading advertisements.  That is where non-profit advocacy 
groups come into play.  Groups that advocate on behalf of policy 
issues that register as “social welfare” groups under 501(c)(4) of 
the Internal Revenue Code may spend unlimited funds to create 
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642 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:615   
political advertisements about such issues without disclosing 
who their donors are.170  Thus, an environmental or gun rights 
group, for example, can create advocacy ads attacking or sup-
porting a candidate based on her position on the issues of concern 
to such group, with no amount limits and no disclosure of who its 
donors are.171  This dark-money loophole also allows foreign 
money to infiltrate American elections secretly, even though 
foreign contributions are prohibited.172  These groups are often 
referred to as “dark money” groups, since their donors are not 
disclosed.173  It is difficult to know how much dark money is being 
spent on political campaigns, since these groups do not have to 
disclose all of their expenditures to the FEC.174  While it is known 
that at least $1 billion in dark money has been spent on federal 
elections since 2010, this figure likely represents a conservative 
estimate.175  In the 2018 election cycle, approximately one-third 
of all advertising from outside groups in senate races was bought 
by dark money groups,176 and a majority of overall outside 
spending was by dark-money sources or groups that take money 
from such sources.177 
Additionally, the FEC is charged with enforcing campaign 
finance laws.178  One way it does this is by requiring candidates, 
political parties, PACs and super PACs to disclose amounts 
raised and spent on elections.179  Unfortunately, beyond this, the 
FEC accomplishes very little.180  The commission is composed of 
six members; no more than three are allowed from one political 
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/federal-election-commission [https://perma.cc/CY49-EB36] (last visited June 3, 2021). 
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party.181  Thus, in practice, that means the commission is effec-
tively paralyzed by gridlock.182  In 2015, FEC Chair Ann Ravel 
said that “the likelihood of [campaign finance] laws being 
enforced [was] slim” prior to the 2016 elections.183  Not surpris-
ingly, enforcement actions have dropped significantly as a result 
of the FEC’s gridlock: in 2006, the FEC assessed over $5.5 
million in civil penalties, but this amount has consistently been 
under one million dollars annually since 2009.184  Not surprising-
ly, enforcement actions have dropped significantly as a result.  In 
such an environment, the ability of the FEC to stop super PACs 
from coordinating, in a practical if not literal sense, with 
campaigns is almost non-existent.185  If these problems were not 
enough, the FEC has been unable to function since September 
2019 due to a lack of sufficient members to constitute a quorum, 
resulting in over “300 cases on its . . . docket that cannot be 
resolved.”186 
D. The Internet and Social Media 
With the 2020 election cycle getting into high gear, can-
didates and advocacy groups are poised to spend over $1.6 billion 
on internet and social media advertising.187  However, there is 
virtually no federal regulation covering these advertisements.188  
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Digital advertising presents increased risks for our democracy, 
with its ability to directly target groups with disinformation, 
raising the need for appropriate controls.189  However, internet 
platforms and social media are not considered broadcasters 
subject to many of the current FEC rules.190  More and more 
people have argued for the need for clear rules for regulating 
political advertising on the web and social media.191  Realistically, 
however, what are these calls for regulation likely to achieve?  
Given the severe First Amendment limitations to regulating 
content in television advertising,192 even a rigorous mapping of 
television rules to digital platforms will result in all the same 
limits and potential problems. 
Furthermore, until quite recently, internet and social media 
platforms seemed uninterested or unwilling to self-regulate 
political advertisements.193  Even if such platforms were willing 
to police the content posted, this raises several major concerns.  
First, as is always the case with censoring political content, are 
we comfortable as a society with a private company making such 
determinations?  How will the public know whether a platform is 
biasing an election by being stricter in banning or allowing one 
candidate’s content over another’s?194  Additionally, what liability 
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would this form of self-regulation expose a platform to for 
incorrectly identifying and blocking false or misleading content?   
On another front, the United States’ national security 
apparatus attempts to monitor and combat foreign government 
attacks on our elections, including the dissemination of false and 
misleading information via digital media.195  However, the low 
cost of producing disinformation and the ability to quickly dis-
tribute it via multiple avenues limits the effectiveness of such 
efforts.196  Additionally, these efforts are focused only on foreign-
based disinformation, even though there is considerable domes-
tically produced misinformation content.197  Furthermore, every 
time an attack is thwarted, it is easily redirected back via 
another webpage or portal.198  The country’s guardians lack suf-
ficient resources to effectively combat these attacks.199 
E. For the People Act of 2019 
In March of 2019, the House of Representatives overwhelm-
ingly approved the For the People Act of 2019.200  Since then, the 
bill has languished, awaiting action by the Senate, with no 
progress to speak of since March 2019.  This bill proposes a 
number of changes to how the United States conducts elections 
and is designed to improve our democracy; most of these pro-
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posed reforms are beyond the scope of this Article.201  However, 
several of its provisions impact matters that have been ad-
dressed.  The bill expands disclosure rules for organizations 
spending money during elections, for campaign advertisements 
and for online platforms, and revises disclaimer requirements for 
political advertising.202  It also expands the ban on foreign 
nationals expending funds in United States elections, and repeals 
the treasury regulation that allows 501(c)(4) organizations not to 
disclose who their donors are.203  While these are all welcome 
improvements, none of these changes fundamentally affect the 
corrosive power of the need candidates have for vast sums of 
money, nor most of the problems being caused by the growing 
dissemination of misinformation to the electorate, largely due to 
the limitations imposed by the First Amendment.  Title V of the 
bill would also create a program that would provide federal funds 
matching six times the amount of eligible small-donor contri-
butions to a candidate.204  This provision is designed to help offset 
the massive amounts of funds being poured into campaigns by 
super PACs, often from very few actual people, in an effort to 
amplify the diluted voice of the average voter.205  While this is a 
step toward offsetting the massive influence of big-donor money 
on our political system, it does nothing to stem the tide of ever-
growing need for more money to get elected. 
F. Honest Ads Act of 2019 
In 2019, the Honest Ads Act was reintroduced in both the 
House and Senate.206  While forward progress on this proposed 
legislation seems unlikely at this time,207 the bill, if passed, 
would update the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 
expand the current disclosure requirements regarding who has 
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bought TV, print, and radio ads to the internet.208  It would also 
require reasonable efforts by platforms to ensure that advertise-
ments are not purchased by foreign governments, disclosure of 
how advertisements were targeted, and the cost of those adver-
tisements.209  While this act would help clarify digital advertising 
regulation, such disclosures will do little to combat the deluge of 
misinformation flooding online political advertising.   
IV.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
With all of the problems that our current approach to regu-
lating political speech allows or causes, how can the United 
States change its approach to make democracy function better? 
A. Make Politicians and Other Political Advertisers Accountable 
for Their Lies and Misinformation  
Some have argued that current defamation laws, possibly 
with some tweaking, could be better used to hold politicians and 
others accountable when they lie or spread disinformation in 
their advertisements.210  The risk of accountability would then 
presumably lead to advertisers lying less, or at least to confining 
their statements to matters that are less clearly and verifiably 
false.  If meaningful accountability were in place and advertisers 
were so deterred, this would help solve the misinformation crisis 
that the United States finds itself in.  The good news is that defa-
mation is well established as an exception to First Amendment 
free speech rights, and there have been successful cases brought 
in the area of political speech by defamed parties.211  However, 
such an approach presents several conceptual difficulties and 
raises other major risks that likely outweigh the potential 
benefits of pursing this idea.  
First, defamation law is directed at stopping one party from 
lying about another, but it is poorly suited to dealing with 
situations where a candidate is lying about herself.  When a can-
didate lies about herself or her accomplishments, no one has been 
defamed, so no one would have standing to sue for defamation.212   
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The second problem with the approach arises from the 
current “actual malice” liability standard for defaming a public 
figure.213  Having to show actual intent to spread an untruth, or 
reckless disregard for the truth, has proven to be a difficult bar to 
meet.214  However, lowering this standard for political figures 
risks overbroad liability, and more importantly, a substantial 
chilling effect on overall political speech if politicians constantly 
had to live in fear of liability for false or inaccurate statements.215 
The next obstacle this approach faces is determining which 
statements are actionable.  If a politician makes an unrealistic 
promise—as politicians have done forever—does that count as a 
prohibited lie?  The answer should be no.  Promises of future 
action are, at the time made, non-actionable because no one can 
know what a politician will do until after being elected.  And 
even then, circumstances and opinions can change.  Putting aside 
such an easy example, what about misstatements of verifiable 
facts as opposed to statements of opinion?  This has a certain 
appeal, given that a similar distinction already exists in other 
areas of law.  Pursuant to Article 2 of the UCC, statements of 
fact regarding goods being sold must be true to avoid breaching 
an express warranty.216  But statements of opinion, or “puffing,” 
are not actionable.217  Unfortunately, politicians are masters at 
parsing speech.  If falsely saying your opponent is a sexual preda-
tor is actionable, but disingenuously saying you believe your 
opponent is a sexual predator is not, political ads will quickly 
shift their language when spreading disinformation to present 
such lies as subtly stated opinions. 
A further obstacle that must be overcome is determining who 
gets to decide whether an advertisement creates liability.  Since 
this is an issue of liability for defamatory actions that have 
already occurred, the obvious choice for enforcement would be the 
court system, to ensure due process requirements are met.  
Unfortunately, the court process moves slowly, and as a result 
any ruling would be unlikely to occur prior to voting.  As such, a 
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party that chooses to lie may well find the lie effective in getting 
the person elected despite risking liability.218   
Compounding this problem is the issue of what type of 
liability would attach to such conduct.219  If the only remedy is a 
fine or monetary damages, the lying candidate still gains office 
and the court award merely becomes another cost of getting 
elected—a cost that is ultimately a drop in the bucket to a major 
campaign.  Of course, one could consider other types of remedies: 
incarceration, loss of office, or enjoining the advertisement.  But 
each of these options carries other potential problems.  In the 
highly divided and partisan society in which the United States 
now finds itself, few should be comfortable jailing candidates for 
false advertising.  Such a remedy is also potentially excessive.  
Would one false advertisement or claim about an opponent be 
enough, or would the conduct need to be pervasive?  Such a 
possibility would encourage overuse of the courts as a way to 
potentially remove an opponent.  Given the fine line that often 
exists between facts and opinions, and the central importance of 
political speech to a healthy democracy, such a major conse-
quence for a misstep would have a major chilling effect on 
political speech.  Generally, the only nations that imprison politi-
cians for “lying” about their opponents are dictatorships, which 
use incarceration to suppress dissent and incapacitate opposi-
tion.220  Loss of office is certainly a lesser penalty than incarcera-
tion, but if a single lie could result in ineligibility, would any 
candidate qualify?  In the course of a campaign, lies will almost 
always occur, and so would post-election lawsuits from losing 
candidates trying to disqualify victorious opponents.   
Enjoining a misleading ad from running seems like a more 
balanced potential remedy—it stops the misinformation from 
being disseminated without reducing the remedy to a mere cost 
of getting elected or over-penalizing the act.  But banning adver-
tisements with falsehoods presents its own set of problems, 
which are discussed in the next Section.  
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More broadly, any attempt to create additional accounta-
bility for spreading political disinformation faces a major 
jurisdictional limitation: enforcement actions against advertise-
ments on foreign-based digital platforms would be difficult to 
pursue, as it would be unlikely for the rogue actors to subject 
themselves to the United States’ court system. 
Finally, any accountability-based regime would, at most, 
help mitigate the spread of disinformation.  It would do nothing 
to stem the meteoric growth of campaign spending and all of its 
attendant problems. 
B.  Ban Misleading and Factually Incorrect Political Advertising 
Another possibility is to ban political advertising that is mis-
leading or factually incorrect.  The European Union, and in 
particular Germany, has begun heading down this avenue with 
significant fines for failure to remove false or misleading content 
upon notice to do so.221  This approach could take one of two 
forms: advertisements could require pre-approval before publica-
tion, or disseminated content that is flagged as potentially false 
could be investigated and then ordered removed if falsity is 
confirmed.  The second approach appears to fit nicely within the 
current FTC prohibition on, and enforcement mechanisms for, 
false and misleading advertising222 applicable to non-political 
advertising.  
The benefit of either approach is that false and misleading 
information would be removed.  The concerns raised by both of 
these possibilities are largely the same, but with two exceptions.  
First, pre-approval would require every ad to be reviewed, 
whereas flagging potentially problematic ads would require 
review only of those flagged.  In the highly politicized environ-
ment we now live in, this may result in little actual difference.  If 
viewers are allowed to flag potentially violating content, trolls 
will likely flag virtually everything.223  However, if this does not 
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occur, a flagging-based approach should have fewer transactional 
costs and thus be administratively cheaper.  On the other hand, a 
flagging-based approach allows disinformation to disseminate 
and influence people before it is dealt with. 
Overall, however, these minor differences pale in comparison 
to the more significant concerns raised by banning false and 
misleading political advertising.  First, such a ban runs afoul of 
the parameters set out by the Supreme Court for political 
speech.224  The Court has held that good and bad political ideas—
false and true ones—are to battle it out in the marketplace of 
ideas, with the belief that this process will allow the truth to 
prevail.225  Ignoring the naivete of this historic view in an era of 
misleading ads directly targeted at those most likely to be af-
fected by them,226 any ban on political speech will have to survive 
a strict scrutiny review.  Even if preventing political misinforma-
tion in the digital age rises to the level of a compelling state 
interest, a ban is unlikely to meet the requirement of being 
narrowly tailored, and most certainly is not the least restrictive 
option available.  Obviously, a system that required labelling of 
advertisements as potentially false or misleading to put con-
sumers on notice would be less restrictive than a ban.227 
Furthermore, such an approach poses significant risks to a 
democracy.228  Who makes the final decision on which ads get to 
run and which ones are banned?  Letting the government decide 
this matter potentially allows the party in power to favor its own 
candidates or disadvantage others.229  Even a bipartisan commis-
sion runs the risk of lopsided quorums that lead to a similar 
result.  If an even number from both major parties are required 
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to ban an ad, the practical effect is likely to be gridlock, with few 
if any ads being blocked, since neither side will want to vote 
against its candidates.230  Additionally, a bipartisan commission 
runs a meaningful risk of stifling third-party candidates, since 
none of its members would care about protecting ads by them.   
Handing decision-making over to the courts appears better 
on its face, given the supposed independence of the judiciary, but 
the court system is ill-equipped to process such cases in a timely 
manner.231  And in this hyper-partisan age, it is more likely just 
to cause further politicization of the courts and further mistrust 
of the judiciary by the public.  Given these concerns, it is not sur-
prising that few major democracies have embraced this option.232  
The nations that allow such bans are almost exclusively totali-
tarian and use this power to suppress dissent. 
Finally, the FCC has little ability to reach foreign actors.  
While the FCC can coopt United States–based broadcast net-
works and digital platforms into helping it police such a policy, 
its ability to do so for platforms based outside the United States 
is practically nonexistent.233  Thus banning politically misleading 
advertising would allow foreign-based disinformation to coexist 
next to domestic content that met truthfulness standards.  In 
such a situation, people might actually be more inclined to 
believe both types of content than they would be now, where no 
political advertising has an imprimatur of legitimacy based on 
passing a truth-based filtering process.  Of course, foreign elec-
tion interference is already prohibited, and the national security 
apparatus already works to combat foreign misinformation.234  
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But as has been noted, the ease with which foreign actors can 
create new portals for dissemination and the limited resources of 
the United States’ cybersecurity apparatus makes this a never-
ending game of whack-a-mole with bad data perpetually leaking 
through.235 
C. Publicly Funded Campaigns 
Support for publicly funded campaigns has gained traction 
recently, as evidenced by its inclusion in the For the People Act of 
2019.236  However, this idea is less grandiose than it first appears.  
Given the holding in Citizens United—that the government 
cannot limit direct expenditures by people on behalf of political 
causes or politicians they support237—these proposals rarely 
suggest eliminating private funding, but rather suggest provid-
ing a level of public funding to candidates via matching funds for 
contributions that candidate receives.238  Furthermore, the Court’s 
ruling in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett prohibits using escalating matching funds, so a publicly 
funded option could not be structured to directly offset amounts 
spent by a candidate’s opponent and her supporters.239  As such, 
these proposals, by themselves, would do nothing to combat 
misinformation and do little to stem the corrosive effects of 
money on politics.  While having such funds available might 
allow some politicians to be less beholden to big-money donors 
and allow more non-wealthy candidates to successfully run for 
office, it would throw more money into the advertising arms race, 
and many politicians would still deem it advantageous to raise 
larger amounts from major donors.   
 
against the United States); Global Engagement Center: Core Mission & Vision, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-
diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/ [https://perma.cc/3UDZ-DMBL] 
(last visited June 7, 2021) (describing the State Department’s Global Engagement 
Center, whose mission is to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign 
state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or 
influencing . . . the United States”). 
235 See supra Section II.C; Ortutay, supra note 122. 
236 For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 5211 (2019). 
237 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010). 
238 See, e.g., H.R. 1 § 5201(a)(1)(A) (proposing that the federal government 
provide six times the amount a candidate receives in small-money campaign 
contributions). 
239 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754–55 
(2011). 
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D. Digital Platform Self-Regulation 
With the exception of Twitter, which due to its structure 
generates little in the way of advertising content,240 most digital 
platforms had shown little interest in monitoring or regulating 
political advertising prior to 2020.241  However, with rampant 
misinformation being spread via social media in the run-up to 
the 2020 election, several of the major social media platforms 
have begun labeling content as misleading or removing it 
outright.242  One advantage of this approach is that it can be 
likely be done without running afoul of the First Amendment.  As 
private companies, digital platforms are not government actors, 
and therefore are generally allowed to regulate speech as they 
wish.243  Furthermore, as the parties hosting the content, they 
are in the best position to monitor and control content on their 
platforms. 
If these and other social media platforms decide to continue 
pursuing this approach, it raises other significant concerns, 
however.244  Each company can, and will, set its own policies.  At 
a minimum, this creates inconsistencies and the possibility of 
confusion, making it harder for people to know which content has 
been vetted or filtered and which has not.  Potentially more 
disturbingly, as private citizens, there is no legal prohibition 
against a platform favoring certain views or candidates over 
others, thereby creating more disinformation.245  While the desire 
to have broad market appeal may discourage some companies 
from heading in this direction, television networks like Fox News 
and MSNBC indicate a viable market for information providers 
 
240 Katie Snyder, Twitter’s Decision to Ban Political Ads: Violation of First 
Amendment Rights?, U. RICH. J.L. & TECH. BLOG (Nov. 19, 2019), https://jolt.richmond 
.edu/2019/11/19/twitters-decision-to-ban-political-ads-violation-of-first-amendment-
rights [https://perma.cc/CVS2-MQSZ] (noting that Twitter’s platform differs from 
Facebook’s, since advertisements on Twitter are not as popular or common); 
Gillespie, supra note 56. 
241 Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1244–46; see generally Beyersdorf, supra 
note 10; Gillespie, supra note 56. 
242 See generally, Lerman et al., supra note 120. 
243 Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1522; Jessica Melugin, Twitter’s Ban on Political 
Ads Has No First Amendment Implications, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Oct. 31, 
2019), https://cei.org/blog/twitters-ban-political-ads-has-no-first-amendment-implications 
[https://perma.cc/F6QD-2J2V]; Heater, supra note 194. 
244 See Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1244–46 (offering a more detailed 
discussion of some of these problems). 
245 As has been noted, conservatives are already complaining about bias from 
traditional social media platforms and are encouraging a migration to a conservative 
platform. See Wellemeyer, supra note 194. 
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with a clear political leaning.  That said, broadcast networks 
require a license from the FCC that places certain limits on their 
ability to discriminate in accepting advertising—candidates for 
federal office must be provided with reasonable access to 
advertising opportunities.246  Thus, current proposals to extend 
broadcast rules to digital media could help minimize platform 
bias.  But although this may help solve the concern with bias 
domestically, it would have little impact extraterritorially.  Fur-
thermore, the misinformation problems present with the hands-
off broadcast regulation system would be equally present in the 
digital arena—especially with the constitutional limitations 
present.247  Finally, even if a company is not trying to play favor-
ites, self-enforcement of one’s own policies runs the risk of 
censoring material that should not be removed while allowing 
other more problematic content to remain.  This risk is especially 
present with the massive number of potential micro-targeted ads 
being created.248  These internal and platform-to-platform incon-
sistencies could have a material impact on an election.   
E.  Media Literacy Campaigns 
Several governments have begun or are considering media 
literacy campaigns, aimed at helping their citizens develop skills 
to better identify false and misleading content.249  While such 
programs are better than nothing and can help create more 
informed consumers, they are almost certainly inadequate for 
solving the problems caused by massive and widespread dis-
information.250  It is very difficult for a nation to provide mean-
ingful education to its citizens who have already completed their 
 
246 Dan Kirkpatrick, Political Broadcasting Rules Q&A, COMMLAWBLOG (Feb. 
27, 2018), https://www.commlawblog.com/2018/02/articles/deadlines/political-
broadcasting-rules-qa/ [https://perma.cc/NYV9-RV3S]. 
247 See supra Sections III.A, III.B. 
248 See generally Lightman, supra note 49. 
249 Annina Claesson, Coming Together To Fight Fake News: Lessons from the Euro-
pean Approach to Disinformation, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.csis.org/coming-together-fight-fake-news-lessons-european-approach-
disinformation [https://perma.cc/DKA7-5ACZ]; Action Plan Against Disinformation, 
at 9–11, JOIN (2018) 36 final (May 12, 2018); see generally Funke & Flamini, supra 
note 220. 
250 See Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1268–71 (discussing the advantages of 
such an approach). 
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formal education.251  There is no effective way to bring all adults 
in to receive this education, making it hard for such a campaign 
to reach a nation’s entire electorate.  As such, these programs are 
most likely to be most effective for those still in school, but are 
unlikely to reach the most vulnerable targets for misinformation: 
the old and the poorly educated.252  Furthermore, with deep-fake 
technology improving all the time, even sophisticated consumers 
of information will become more susceptible to being misled.  In 
such a climate, it is difficult to imagine the truth winning in the 
marketplace of ideas. 
F. Ban Political Advertising on Television and Digital 
Platforms 
While there are occasional mentions of the idea of banning 
political advertising, it seldom receives serious consideration in 
the United States.253  Given massive advertising costs, the cor-
rupting influence of money on modern politics, and the preva-
lence of disinformation in advertising, it is time to reconsider this 
alternative.  The massive rise in misinformation has pushed 
society to the point where it is preferable to ban false advertising, 
as opposed to allowing the spread of lies, especially in an era 
where misinformation can be narrowly targeted for maximum 
effectiveness.254  In the two-week runup to the most recent 
British election, Britain’s leading fact-checking organization Full 
Fact identified over eighty-eight percent of the Conservative 
Party’s digital ads as false or misleading.255 
A ban on all television and digital political advertising would 
remove a candidate’s need for large sums of money to get elected 
and, with that, the influence major donors have over politi-
 
251 Susan Nash, Older Adults and Technology: Moving Beyond the Stereotypes, 
STAN. CTR. ON LONGEVITY (Apr. 13, 2019), http://longevity.stanford.edu/older-adults-
and-technology-moving-beyond-the-stereotypes/ [https://perma.cc/NE5S-4DS9]. 
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(May 2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018161.pdf [https://perma.cc/RMZ4-6HQG]; 
Nash, supra note 251.  
253 But see Langvardt, supra note 78, at 241, 246 (proposing a ban on political 
advertising and expenditures).  
254 See generally Ed. Bd., supra note 188; Lightman, supra note 49; Ed. Bd., 
supra note 113; Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1234–37. 
255 Alastair Reid & Carlotta Dotto, Thousands of Misleading Conservative Ads 
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cians.256  Considering where money gets spent during elections, 
this ban would need to apply to all political television advertis-
ing.257  Less clear is whether it should also apply to internet and 
social media advertising.  Historic spending levels suggest that 
removing television advertising would remove the overwhelming 
majority of funds needed to run for office.258   
However, internet and social media ad spending is growing 
rapidly, given that people increasingly turn to these outlets for 
their news and given the ability to micro-target potential voters 
with ads most designed to appeal to them.259  Furthermore, if 
television advertising alone was banned without currently 
unconstitutional caps on political advertising spending, the large 
sums of money currently being raised would likely just be 
diverted to internet and social media.  The only reason to consid-
er excluding such materials is that most internet-based advertis-
ing can be viewed over longer periods and more carefully than TV 
ads.  Television ads, by virtue of their format, stream in real 
time, often resulting in viewers not picking up on subtle caveats 
and phraseology.  Internet ads often have the potential to be 
viewed as a page and carefully scrutinized, as videos can be 
clicked on and viewed again so that the viewer can digest the 
material as fully as desired.  However, false content is no more 
likely to be discovered by a viewer simply from careful or 
multiple viewings, without referencing external information.260  
Based on these considerations taken as a whole, both television 
and internet advertising would need to fall within the scope of 
the ban for it to be effective.  Other types of advertising, including 
radio, direct mail, and yard placards, are currently insignificant 
and unlikely to absorb significant additional expenditures, given 
their comparative effectiveness.261  As such, they should be exempt 
from such a ban, thereby allowing some avenues for candidates 
to get their message out. 
Such a ban would allow politicians to spend far less time 
fundraising and spend the time saved attending to their actual 
jobs of legislating.  More importantly, it would remove the leash 
 
256 Langvardt, supra note 78, at 241–42. 
257 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
258 See id.  
259 See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.  
260 Misleading content, however, may be exposed in some circumstances by 
careful reexamination. 
261 Kaye, supra note 28.  
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held by lobbyists and big-money donors over politicians and allow 
a candidate’s constituents to take primacy, thereby improving 
the United States’ representative democracy.  Given the reduced 
need for money by candidates, a true publicly funded campaign 
system could be financially viable.  If implemented, this system 
would remove any remaining corrupting influences of money on 
the election process, though the need for such funds is likely to be 
rather modest in light of advertising’s elimination.  Similarly, it 
would make it easier for people with less money to run for office 
successfully. 
Equally important, this ban effectively eliminates all the 
misinformation being spread by deceptive advertising, regardless 
of the source.  Concerns about the future quality of deep-fakes 
and their ability to deceive people would largely be eliminated.  
All candidate advertising is banned, but so are ads by PACs and 
super PACs.  Web and social media ads, if based on a United 
States platform, would be covered by the ban.  As a result, every-
one would know that if they saw a political ad, it must be from a 
foreign source, and accordingly should not be trusted.  Further-
more, concerns about decisionmaker bias do not apply since there 
are no real decisions to be made, making a comprehensive ban 
preferable to a ban based on misleading content. 
A ban solves both the money in politics problems and the 
misinformation problems, even extraterritorially.  So, what are 
the downsides of a ban?  From a practical standpoint, there are 
few negatives to this proposal.  Obviously, there is some issue 
with what exactly constitutes a political advertisement subject to 
the ban, as many statements have political overtones or values 
imbedded in them.  This concern is less poignant than it might 
appear at first glance.  As proposed, advertisements that attack 
or promote a candidate, party, or ballot initiative would be 
prohibited.  Public service announcements, like a piece on the 
effects of climate change on rising coastal water levels, would be 
excluded from the ban unless they are targeted at a jurisdiction 
or populace in a jurisdiction that is voting on a matter related to 
the public service accouncement’s message.  The FEC currently 
recognizes a difference between express advocacy, advocating for 
or against a candidate or issue, and issue advocacy, support for 
or against a policy, with most of the limited regulation being 
directed at express advocacy.262  However, since policy issues can 
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be voted upon apart from candidates, issue advocacy should be 
included in the advertising ban.  A new distinction based on 
whether the advertisement is designed to promote voting 
behavior in an upcoming election or merely designed to promote 
support for a policy viewpoint generally should be used instead. 
Another concern is that such a program could favor incum-
bents in political races, since they are better known than their 
challengers, and challengers are perceived to need advertising to 
make themselves known.263  While there is unquestionably some 
truth in this concern, this objection is likely an oversimplification 
of the incumbent’s advantage, and the disadvantage can be 
mitigated.  First, incumbents also generally possess a fundrais-
ing advantage over challengers.264  So if advertising is allowed, 
the money advantage creates the same problems as being lesser 
known if advertising were prohibited.265   
Second, the ban applies to advertising, but not to appearing 
on television generally.  Thus, one way for a candidate to make 
herself known is by appearing in a sanctioned debate.  Given the 
ban on advertising, every candidate listed on the ballot should 
have a right to appear in any debate for the office.  Since this 
becomes one of the most important ways to get to know the 
candidates who are running, debate viewership should increase, 
especially if the electorate is not constantly being bombarded by 
ads.  Furthermore, a debate is the best place for a candidate to 
put forth arguments for himself and against his opponents, as a 
debate has built-in accountability—one’s opponent will call atten-
tion to any attempted misinformation.  Another minor enhance-
ment to debates from an advertising ban is that it essentially 
removes a leading candidate’s ability to dodge debating her 
opponents.  With fewer ways to promote oneself, candidates will 
have a strong incentive to participate in debates.   
 
263 See generally Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Regulation, UNIV. OF VT. 
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The other major way to get known is by appearing on 
established television shows.266  This occurs regularly already, 
with candidates regularly appearing on news and talk shows.  
Like debates, these shows also provide a level of accountability 
for truthfulness, albeit to a lesser extent, in the form of questions 
and pushback from the host.  While such pushback will be limited 
when appearing on a friendly network, the need for a broader 
appeal will motivate candidates to appear on multiple networks.  
Furthermore, the veracity rating proposal discussed in the next 
Section as an additional step would apply to television shows, 
and will provide additional cautioning against misinformation 
when candidates appear on a biased platform.267 
The biggest problem with a ban is that it would clearly vio-
late the First Amendment.268  A ban is neither narrowly tailored 
nor the least restrictive means available, as required by current 
jurisprudence.  Such a barrier should not deter the United States 
from adopting this approach, but it does mean that accom-
plishing such a step will likely take a significant period of time.  
As such, one must consider other steps that can be taken in the 
interim to help solve the problems facing our democracy. 
While not a problem per se, a ban on political advertising 
would do nothing to stop the spread of disinformation by biased 
or disreputable news outlets. 
G. Grade Content for Veracity 
A final possible solution—one which the author of this 
Article advocates taking in conjunction with a ban on television 
and digital political advertising—is to develop a robust evalua-
tion and grading system for political advertisements, news 
networks, and news shows to inform consumers of information’s 
veracity until a ban can go into effect.  While political fact-
checking has been around for some time, and the idea of a 
ratings system for political advertisements has been tossed 
around by various commentators,269 there has been little attempt 
to fully describe the details of such a system. 
 
266 The point of this phraseology is to make clear that buying a full television 
time slot to run an infomercial would be considered an advertisement rather than a 
television show appearance. 
267 See infra Section IV.G.  
268 See supra Section III.A.  
269 See Gillespie, supra note 56. 
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The idea itself is rather simple: all political advertising—
until a ban is constitutional—will be rated on its level of veracity 
before the ad is permitted to run.  And every time the ad runs or 
appears digitally, it must include a banner indicating the rating 
it received.  Similarly, news and opinion shows will receive 
ratings that will be shown on-screen throughout the show, tied to 
how forthrightly the shows present the news—with ratings based 
on frequency and level of deception in what is reported.270  With 
easily identifiable tags tied to veracity ratings, people can run 
whatever advertisements and commentary they wish, and others 
can consume whatever content they wish, but the consumer will 
be clearly put on notice about the likelihood they are being 
misled.  Thus, the information consumer is put in a much better 
position to decide whether the information being digested de-
serves additional scrutiny before being accepted.  An enhanced 
version of this approach in online media could include links in 
the ratings banner to more detailed information on why the 
advertisement is misleading. 
Operationalizing this simple concept is somewhat more 
complex.  While such a system does not prohibit any content from 
reaching consumers, the ratings are still likely to affect con-
sumers substantially over time.  As such, it is important to 
construct this system carefully to minimize the government’s 
role—both to minimize constitutional concerns and to diminish 
the possibility of favoritism.  Limiting the governmental role 
would also maximize the likelihood that the ratings will be 
impartial and accurate. 
The first thing that must be considered is who gets to 
conduct the ratings.  If the government creates the ratings, this 
unnecessarily entangles the government in regulating political 
speech.  More importantly, it raises the significant risk of bias in 
favor of those in power.271  While allowing private parties to 
control the process avoids these concerns, it runs a high risk of 
the entire system becoming meaningless.  If a private company 
can choose to become a rater with few limitations on eligibility, 
partisan companies will be formed in order to make high veracity 
ratings available for advertisements and news programs aligning 
with their orientations.   
 
270 See Wood & Ravel, supra note 10, at 1229–34 (arguing that “Fake News” is 
political advertising). 
271 Hasen, supra note 11, at 56, 64. 
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Likewise, allowing content viewers to rate what they are 
viewing is fraught with peril.272  The point of a ratings system is 
to allow experts to help guide people who otherwise could be 
deceived.  The average person is unlikely to have the skills, 
knowledge, or desire to conduct the fact check necessary to 
establish a rating that is more than a personal preference.  
Furthermore, in these polarized times, there is every reason to 
believe that trolls would give great ratings to sites that confirm 
their biases and to torpedo sites they disagree with, furthering 
the self-selection echo chamber problem.  One need only look to 
Sean Spicer’s successful run on Dancing with the Stars, in spite 
of being an objectively terrible dancer, to see how people can be 
mobilized based on their political leanings to support a ques-
tionable cause.273 
Given these concerns, the best approach to verification would 
be a two-step process whereby one entity promulgates and en-
forces rules for eligible evaluators, and then approved evaluators 
engage in the evaluation process.  For the first step, allowing one 
or more private parties to approve potential evaluators runs the 
risk of bias in who gets approved, which would result in the 
process being corrupted.   
The better approach is to create a bipartisan commission 
made up of an equal number of representatives from the Demo-
cratic and Republican parties.274  To avoid selection bias that 
could occur if the president were empowered to nominate candi-
dates for approval and to avoid the risk of unfilled vacancies, 
both the majority and minority parties in one chamber of 
congress would select an equal number of representatives to the 
committee.275  Any entity wishing to become an evaluator would 
apply to the committee for approval, and approval would require 
the positive recommendation of a majority of the total committee.  
 
272 Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1548 (arguing that allowing people to rate the ve-
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By requiring a majority of the committee to approve an applicant, 
no applicant could be approved without some level of bipartisan 
support.  This obviously creates a risk of difficulties in getting 
approved, but the consequences of this are far less harmful than 
allowing one side to be able to approve biased raters, which could 
undermine the credibility of the entire process.  Furthermore, 
since each side will want its candidates to be able to advertise, 
there is a strong incentive to work together to get evaluators 
approved. 
The next question that must be answered is how this 
commission decides whether to approve an applicant.  In order to 
know whether a company is capable of accurately evaluating the 
veracity of content, one must examine its record for accuracy and 
bias.  As such, companies that have been engaged in rating 
content for truthfulness for at least a year would be eligible for 
immediate certification, pending a review by the commission of 
their past year’s evaluations.  Each year, a company will have to 
reapply for certification based on the prior year’s activities to 
ensure the company remains neutral in its evaluations.  For com-
panies with less than a year of evaluations, the committee can 
provide a set of test evaluations for the applicant to perform, 
which if passed would allow the company to begin evaluations for 
the following six months, at which time it would be re-evaluated 
based on its performance.  After a full year of operations, it would 
be evaluated again and move to a yearly renewal cycle.  As 
membership-based international fact-checking organizations 
proliferate,276 the committee could decide that membership in 
such an organization that has appropriately stringent member-
ship requirements is sufficient for approval.  Such deemed 
sufficiency could further help prevent gridlock by the committee.   
One risk to this model would be posed by a start-up company 
that accurately performs any test created to get accredited but 
does so with the intent, once licensed, of certifying biased 
information in the critical months before an election.  Even 
though such a company would not be recertified, the company 
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perma.cc/VH5E-JZCM]. 
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could nonetheless sow havoc for one election cycle and then go 
out of business, only to re-emerge under a new name a few years 
later to do the same again.  Several measures should be taken to 
combat this risk.  First, new companies—those without a year of 
past evaluations—should not be approved in the six-month 
period before a major election cycle.  This forces any applicants to 
have a real and meaningful history that must be reviewed before 
approval, when the stakes become important.  Of course, a com-
pany could potentially do its job properly until the election cycle 
heats up, only to reveal its true intent.  To further combat this 
scenario, the commission should have the power to bring civil 
and criminal penalties against any company, and its officers, 
whose accuracy in grading significantly departs from its his-
torical record during an election cycle.  Furthermore, companies 
and their principals could be banned from future certification for 
such activity.  To make these sanctions effective, only companies 
subject to enforceable United States sanctions can be approved. 
In order to post a political advertisement, the candidate, 
PAC, super PAC, or other person wishing to do so must first have 
the advertisement rated by any approved evaluator.  Allowing 
groups to choose their evaluator minimizes the regulatory burden 
being imposed on such party and allows one to avoid any 
evaluator perceived as biased against one’s message.  The ad will 
then be allowed to run by including a banner stating the rating it 
received.  If a party is dissatisfied with a rating, she may have 
another company perform a second evaluation, but both evalua-
tions would have to be displayed with the ad.  Posting an ad-
vertisement without its rating banner would subject the poster to 
criminal penalties and the advertisement from being blocked or 
removed.  Posting a forged banner would subject the poster to 
similar criminal liability. 
The commission will develop the different gradations for 
rating advertisements, but there should be at least four levels: 
(1) highly inaccurate, misleading, or false, (2) somewhat inaccu-
rate, misleading, or false, (3) mostly accurate or true, and 
(4) highly accurate or true.  The ratings banner should also have 
a corresponding color code to make it conspicuous to the viewer.  
While not absolutely necessary, an additional rating could be 
created that labels shows and content that are parody or satire.  
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Furthermore, search engine results could be ordered to make 
results with more credible ratings appear higher in the results.277 
A similar evaluation and disclosure process should also be 
created for news and opinion shows.  This step is necessary, 
given the increasing number of news outlets with clear political 
biases and the amount of opinion programing such networks 
contain.278  As such, a number of these networks and programs 
are actively engaged in disinformation,279 and the ability to create 
a well-informed electorate will remain hampered if such a rating 
system were confined to advertisements.  However, it is imprac-
tical, if not impossible, to pre-rate news content as news is 
developing.  Furthermore, news outlets will invariably get some 
information wrong as stories develop and news breaks, so ratings 
will need to focus less on whether every detail in every story is 
accurate and more on a general evaluation of how misleading the 
show consistently is.  As such, the ratings and banner should 
reflect whether the program in question is (1) highly misleading 
or untrustworthy, (2) somewhat misleading or untrustworthy, 
(3) somewhat accurate or trustworthy, or (4) highly accurate or 
trustworthy based on the prior two to three months’ content.  By 
evaluating relatively recent content over a period of time, shows 
will have an incentive to maintain a higher rating by minimizing 
bias and deception.  Similarly, user-created content from high-
profile people, like tweets from a politician, could be rated based 
on accuracy of recent content, with the account having the rating 
appended to each post. 
Finally, an information campaign must be established to 
help people understand the color-coded rating system.  While 
many may not fully understand the system at first, the pervasive 
scope of the system will become well known and well understood 
by everybody.  This would be similar to how virtually every 
 
277 See Dieter Bohn & Sean Hollister, Google is Changing its Search Algorithm 
To Prioritize Original News Reporting, VERGE (Sept. 12, 2019, 7:12 PM), https:// 
www.theverge.com/2019/9/12/20863305/google-change-search-algorithm-original-
reporting-news-human-raters [https://perma.cc/CD58-RPTS].  
278 See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text.  
279 See Will Sommer et al., Fox News Internal Document Bashes Pro-Trump Fox 
Regulars for Spreading “Disinformation,” DAILY BEAST (Feb. 6, 2020, 7:58 PM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/fox-news-internal-document-bashes-john-solomon-
joe-digenova-and-rudy-giuliani-for-spreading-disinformation [https://perma.cc/UP3J-
KMQY]; Tom Kludt, Fox Has Been “More Fair”: Why Bernie’s Team Has Had It With 
MSNBC, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/02/fox-
has-been-more-fair-why-bernies-team-has-had-it-with-msnbc [https://perma.cc/7DWA-
V97T].  
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American can now recite the Miranda warning,280 even though it 
was created in the case of Miranda v. Arizona,281 and was not 
immediately known by the public.  One important component of 
this campaign will be to instill in the public that any web-based 
content without a rating should be considered highly inaccurate, 
misleading, or false.  This is a necessary step to solve the 
problem of extraterritorial sources of disinformation.  Since the 
internet is global, this United States’ rating and disclosure 
system will be unable to force foreign sites to comply.  However, 
as people come to understand the banner system, the lack of a 
rating will effectively act as a poor rating—viewers will know 
that no rating means it is a foreign site and should be viewed 
with suspicion.  If someone posts a fake banner, that site will be 
blocked.   
This approach has a number of positive attributes.  First, it 
should pass the strict scrutiny test applied to free speech.282  The 
government clearly has a compelling state interest in ensuring 
its citizens are not misinformed, especially about political 
matters.283  The regulation is narrowly tailored to accomplish this 
goal by merely providing information as to likely issues with 
veracity to put viewers on notice, without blocking such content 
or otherwise restricting people from viewing whatever content 
they wish.  Finally, it is hard to imagine a less restrictive means 
to help people avoid being deceived by misinformation than 
posting a warning about the risk that what one is looking at 
might be misleading. 
Second, even if bias creeps into the approval or ratings 
system, the harms caused by a warning are far less than the 
harms that can occur as a result of trying to ban false and 
misleading content.  Furthermore, with a bipartisan approval 
process, regular renewal requirements, a pre-election barrier on 
new evaluators, and the economic incentive of raters to be hired 
for evaluation, there are numerous checks to minimize the risk of 
bias.  Additionally, color-coded banners will constantly remind 
 
280 See Cyrus Farivar, Here’s What a “Digital Miranda Warning” Might Look 
Like, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 29, 2016, 7:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy 
/2016/12/should-the-miranda-warning-be-expanded-to-encompass-passcodes [https:// 
perma.cc/TV5B-NSEP]. 
281 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). 
282 See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.  
283 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349–51 (1995) (recognizing 
the state’s interest in preventing fraudulent statements, which should be all the 
more compelling today given the proliferation of disinformation).  
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consumers of the risks associated with the content they are 
consuming, in a manner that deals with both domestic and 
foreign sources of misinformation, since there is a clear message 
to a viewer if there is no banner.  
As people come to understand the system fully and trust its 
ratings over time, politicians, their supporters, and news pro-
gramming will all have an incentive to be more truthful and 
accurate to avoid getting poor ratings.  As such, the system not 
only helps inform consumers but also creates a positive-feedback 
loop that improves the overall quality of information being 
disseminated.  This in turn should help bring society back to a 
place where people trust the news and have common agreement 
about the facts of a situation, even if they disagree on how to deal 
with a given situation. 
As for downsides to this approach, there are few.  Obviously, 
such a system does nothing to combat the corrosive influence of 
money on politics, which is why it should be pursued in conjunc-
tion with a constitutional amendment that would permit banning 
all political advertising.  Furthermore, people will likely object, 
especially in the early phases of such a system, if their preferred 
information sources receive poor ratings.  While this may hurt 
the acceptance of the system in the short term, information 
sources will want good ratings, causing them to adjust their 
behavior and the situation to correct itself.  To decrease the risk 
of such pushback in the program’s infancy, one option is to have 
the rating system apply to only political advertisements for the 
first few years, so that people can get accustomed to the system 
without it being perceived to attack an information source that 
has established trust with its viewers.  Once people are used to 
the system, it could be expanded to news and news opinion 
programming, hopefully prompting people to reevaluate what 
they have been consuming if necessary.  Finally, there is a cost to 
having to rate all of this material, but that cost should be 
minimal compared to the costs of creating content and 
purchasing advertising time. 
CONCLUSION 
As America worked its way through the 2020 election 
campaign cycle, it was clear that democracy was struggling.  
There were, and still are, concerns associated with voter disen-
franchisement due to unduly strict voter identification standards, 
inadequate access to polling stations, and politically motivated 
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purging of voter rolls.  There were, and still are, concerns about 
the equality of peoples’ votes due to gerrymandering.  There 
were, and still are, concerns about the erosion of the constitu-
tional system of checks and balances, as the executive branch 
grows ever more powerful.  There were, and still are concerns 
about the corrupting influence of money in an era of exponential 
growth in campaign spending.  And there were, and still are con-
cerns about misinformation being disseminated to the masses, by 
politicians, those acting on their behalf, and foreign-state actors 
with malicious intent.  While no one set of actions will address all 
of these concerns, it is imperative for the long-term health of the 
country that these matters are dealt with. 
The current corrosive influence of money on politics and the 
dissemination of disinformation are, in the final analysis, 
essentially problems with how the United States regulates 
political speech.  The nation and its court system remain wedded 
to a historical notion that democracy is best served by allowing a 
full and robust marketplace of ideas, free of virtually any 
restraints, regardless of the degree to which money removes 
power from the people or to which misinformation corrupts the 
market.  Given the well-established effectiveness of misinforma-
tion in the modern era and the corrupting influence of money on 
the electoral process, the United States’ democracy can no longer 
afford its laissez fare approach to regulating political speech. 
However, the risks are very high when one starts restricting 
political speech.  There is a long history of repressive regimes 
stifling dissenting voices to maintain and increase power, and 
there is a substantial likelihood that any powers granted to the 
government to limit political speech will be misused by those in 
power for their own benefit. 
As such, any regulation of political speech must be carefully 
constructed to minimize or eliminate these risks of abuse while 
addressing the underlying problems caused by money and 
disinformation on the electoral process.  When the potential 
solutions to these problems are fully considered in light of the 
risks each alternative presents, the best approach becomes clear.  
To deal with the long-term corrupting influence that money has 
on the political process, as well as the pervasive rise in disinfor-
mation from multiple sources, banning political advertising on 
television, the internet, and social media is the best approach.  It 
would not only effectively remove the need politicians have for 
vast sums of money, but also remove most avenues for spreading 
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disinformation, while allowing more accurate information to flow 
in as a result.  Unfortunately, this solution requires a constitu-
tional amendment or radical change in jurisprudence, so it is a 
long-term solution to work toward.  
In the interim, a robust rating and disclosure regime for 
political advertising would significantly reduce the effectiveness 
of disinformation, would help promote the spread of accurate 
information, and would pose minimal risks of abuse.  By expand-
ing such a regime to include news network programming, this 
approach would similarly promote better and more accurately 
informed voters, making it a desirable modification regardless of 
whether political advertisements can be banned. 
While these approaches will not eliminate all the challenges 
facing the modern democracy of the United States, they can solve 
most of the problems being caused by the way political speech is 
currently regulated. 
